JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
This strategy doubtless provides a framework for innovative historical work, but it also entails analytical sacrifices, not the least of which is its tendency to obscure the workings of what might be called the culture of scientific proof-that is, the process through which expert evidence is generated, circulated, and understood.10 Moreover, displacing the case in favor of context does not in itself guarantee expository sobriety. McLaren's opening words can illustrate both these points: "The most terrifying aspect of strychnine poisoning," he informs his readers, "is that although the convulsions are terrible, you do not lose consciousness; in fact, the mental faculties are largely unimpaired until death ensues. You know that you are dying. The first symptoms are feelings of apprehension and terror followed by muscle stiffness, twitching of the face, and finally tetanic convulsions of the entire body .... Death occurs in one to three hours, the face fixed in a macabre grin and the body arched in hypertension."11 Such "goulish" descriptions, McLaren laments, are necessarily at the center of his work, included not as sensational indulgences, but as unflinching gestures to the real. This strategy doubtless provides a framework for innovative historical work, but it also entails analytical sacrifices, not the least of which is its tendency to obscure the workings of what might be called the culture of scientific proof-that is, the process through which expert evidence is generated, circulated, and understood.10 Moreover, displacing the case in favor of context does not in itself guarantee expository sobriety. McLaren's opening words can illustrate both these points: "The most terrifying aspect of strychnine poisoning," he informs his readers, "is that although the convulsions are terrible, you do not lose consciousness; in fact, the mental faculties are largely unimpaired until death ensues. You know that you are dying. The first symptoms are feelings of apprehension and terror followed by muscle stiffness, twitching of the face, and finally tetanic convulsions of the entire body .... Death occurs in one to three hours, the face fixed in a macabre grin and the body arched in hypertension."11 Such "goulish" descriptions, McLaren laments, are necessarily at the center of his work, included not as sensational indulgences, but as unflinching gestures to the real. This strategy doubtless provides a framework for innovative historical work, but it also entails analytical sacrifices, not the least of which is its tendency to obscure the workings of what might be called the culture of scientific proof-that is, the process through which expert evidence is generated, circulated, and understood.10 Moreover, displacing the case in favor of context does not in itself guarantee expository sobriety. McLaren's opening words can illustrate both these points: "The most terrifying aspect of strychnine poisoning," he informs his readers, "is that although the convulsions are terrible, you do not lose consciousness; in fact, the mental faculties are largely unimpaired until death ensues. You know that you are dying. The first symptoms are feelings of apprehension and terror followed by muscle stiffness, twitching of the face, and finally tetanic convulsions of the entire body .... Death occurs in one to three hours, the face fixed in a macabre grin and the body arched in hypertension."11 Such "goulish" descriptions, McLaren laments, are necessarily at the center of his work, included not as sensational indulgences, but as unflinching gestures to the real. This strategy doubtless provides a framework for innovative historical work, but it also entails analytical sacrifices, not the least of which is its tendency to obscure the workings of what might be called the culture of scientific proof-that is, the process through which expert evidence is generated, circulated, and understood.10 Moreover, displacing the case in favor of context does not in itself guarantee expository sobriety. McLaren's opening words can illustrate both these points: "The most terrifying aspect of strychnine poisoning," he informs his readers, "is that although the convulsions are terrible, you do not lose consciousness; in fact, the mental faculties are largely unimpaired until death ensues. You know that you are dying. The first symptoms are feelings of apprehension and terror followed by muscle stiffness, twitching of the face, and finally tetanic convulsions of the entire body .... Death occurs in one to three hours, the face fixed in a macabre grin and the body arched in hypertension."11 Such "goulish" descriptions, McLaren laments, are necessarily at the center of his work, included not as sensational indulgences, but as unflinching gestures to the real. Yet on closer inspection this apparently unmediated account of strychnine poisoning itself turns out to be a complex scientific and historical product. The source cited by McLaren (from which he more or less transcribes the symptomatology) is the 1883 edition of The Principles and Practices of Medical Jurisprudence, edited by Thomas Stevenson, the Home Office toxicologist who appeared as the lead expert witness for the Cream prosecution. The text's principal author, however, was Stevenson's late colleague at Guy's Hospital, the celebrated medical jurist Alfred Swaine Taylor, and Stevenson's symptomatology is but a slightly modified version of the one appearing in Taylor's last edition. Taylor's description of strychnine poisoning, moreover, had a rich history of its own. His evocation of the victim's subjective state, the terrified sense of impending demise, the grotesque physiognomy in death, and even the telltale twitchings (that is, the constitutive elements of McLaren's portrait of strychnine's "goulish" realities) were altogether absent from his original textbook account in On Poisons in Relation to Medical Jurisprudence (1848), and were written into the symptomatology largely in response to a set of evidentiary details stemming from a subsequent case, namely, the 1856 trial of Dr. William Palmer.12 A related historiographical observation concerns the workings of closure in the Ripper case. Both McLaren and Walkowitz attribute the 1888 Whitechapel murders' grip on the historical imagination in large part to the fact that they were never "solved." Indeed, Walkowitz builds this into her framework for historicizing "true crime," proposing the case's departure from melodrama's generic embrace of resolution as a key to its enduring legacy. The Ripper story, she observes, "achieved no closure," entering into history without "a unified, stable narrative." 13 The result, Walkowitz concludes, is that it remains suspended in a web of uncertainty, "an enigmatic thriller that continually reverberates and reconstructs itself over time." 14 In this essay I am also concerned with questions of instability and retelling, but with an important distinction: the instabilities presented by the Palmer case, its resistance to historical "closure," do not derive from the absence of an authorized solution. Palmer was hanged and has entered posterity as an infamous poisoner, but this does not mean that his is an inviolably unified story. If closure is considered as a provisional Yet on closer inspection this apparently unmediated account of strychnine poisoning itself turns out to be a complex scientific and historical product. The source cited by McLaren (from which he more or less transcribes the symptomatology) is the 1883 edition of The Principles and Practices of Medical Jurisprudence, edited by Thomas Stevenson, the Home Office toxicologist who appeared as the lead expert witness for the Cream prosecution. The text's principal author, however, was Stevenson's late colleague at Guy's Hospital, the celebrated medical jurist Alfred Swaine Taylor, and Stevenson's symptomatology is but a slightly modified version of the one appearing in Taylor's last edition. Taylor's description of strychnine poisoning, moreover, had a rich history of its own. His evocation of the victim's subjective state, the terrified sense of impending demise, the grotesque physiognomy in death, and even the telltale twitchings (that is, the constitutive elements of McLaren's portrait of strychnine's "goulish" realities) were altogether absent from his original textbook account in On Poisons in Relation to Medical Jurisprudence (1848), and were written into the symptomatology largely in response to a set of evidentiary details stemming from a subsequent case, namely, the 1856 trial of Dr. William Palmer.12 A related historiographical observation concerns the workings of closure in the Ripper case. Both McLaren and Walkowitz attribute the 1888 Whitechapel murders' grip on the historical imagination in large part to the fact that they were never "solved." Indeed, Walkowitz builds this into her framework for historicizing "true crime," proposing the case's departure from melodrama's generic embrace of resolution as a key to its enduring legacy. The Ripper story, she observes, "achieved no closure," entering into history without "a unified, stable narrative." 13 The result, Walkowitz concludes, is that it remains suspended in a web of uncertainty, "an enigmatic thriller that continually reverberates and reconstructs itself over time." 14 In this essay I am also concerned with questions of instability and retelling, but with an important distinction: the instabilities presented by the Palmer case, its resistance to historical "closure," do not derive from the absence of an authorized solution. Palmer was hanged and has entered posterity as an infamous poisoner, but this does not mean that his is an inviolably unified story. If closure is considered as a provisional Yet on closer inspection this apparently unmediated account of strychnine poisoning itself turns out to be a complex scientific and historical product. The source cited by McLaren (from which he more or less transcribes the symptomatology) is the 1883 edition of The Principles and Practices of Medical Jurisprudence, edited by Thomas Stevenson, the Home Office toxicologist who appeared as the lead expert witness for the Cream prosecution. The text's principal author, however, was Stevenson's late colleague at Guy's Hospital, the celebrated medical jurist Alfred Swaine Taylor, and Stevenson's symptomatology is but a slightly modified version of the one appearing in Taylor's last edition. Taylor's description of strychnine poisoning, moreover, had a rich history of its own. His evocation of the victim's subjective state, the terrified sense of impending demise, the grotesque physiognomy in death, and even the telltale twitchings (that is, the constitutive elements of McLaren's portrait of strychnine's "goulish" realities) were altogether absent from his original textbook account in On Poisons in Relation to Medical Jurisprudence (1848), and were written into the symptomatology largely in response to a set of evidentiary details stemming from a subsequent case, namely, the 1856 trial of Dr. William Palmer.12 A related historiographical observation concerns the workings of closure in the Ripper case. Both McLaren and Walkowitz attribute the 1888 Whitechapel murders' grip on the historical imagination in large part to the fact that they were never "solved." Indeed, Walkowitz builds this into her framework for historicizing "true crime," proposing the case's departure from melodrama's generic embrace of resolution as a key to its enduring legacy. The Ripper story, she observes, "achieved no closure," entering into history without "a unified, stable narrative." 13 The result, Walkowitz concludes, is that it remains suspended in a web of uncertainty, "an enigmatic thriller that continually reverberates and reconstructs itself over time." 14 In this essay I am also concerned with questions of instability and retelling, but with an important distinction: the instabilities presented by the Palmer case, its resistance to historical "closure," do not derive from the absence of an authorized solution. Palmer was hanged and has entered posterity as an infamous poisoner, but this does not mean that his is an inviolably unified story. If closure is considered as a provisional Yet on closer inspection this apparently unmediated account of strychnine poisoning itself turns out to be a complex scientific and historical product. The source cited by McLaren (from which he more or less transcribes the symptomatology) is the 1883 edition of The Principles and Practices of Medical Jurisprudence, edited by Thomas Stevenson, the Home Office toxicologist who appeared as the lead expert witness for the Cream prosecution. The text's principal author, however, was Stevenson's late colleague at Guy's Hospital, the celebrated medical jurist Alfred Swaine Taylor, and Stevenson's symptomatology is but a slightly modified version of the one appearing in Taylor's last edition. Taylor's description of strychnine poisoning, moreover, had a rich history of its own. His evocation of the victim's subjective state, the terrified sense of impending demise, the grotesque physiognomy in death, and even the telltale twitchings (that is, the constitutive elements of McLaren's portrait of strychnine's "goulish" realities) were altogether absent from his original textbook account in On Poisons in Relation to Medical Jurisprudence (1848), and were written into the symptomatology largely in response to a set of evidentiary details stemming from a subsequent case, namely, the 1856 trial of Dr. William Palmer.12 A related historiographical observation concerns the workings of closure in the Ripper case. Both McLaren and Walkowitz attribute the 1888 Whitechapel murders' grip on the historical imagination in large part to the fact that they were never "solved." Indeed, Walkowitz builds this into her framework for historicizing "true crime," proposing the case's departure from melodrama's generic embrace of resolution as a key to its enduring legacy. The Ripper story, she observes, "achieved no closure," entering into history without "a unified, stable narrative." 13 The result, Walkowitz concludes, is that it remains suspended in a web of uncertainty, "an enigmatic thriller that continually reverberates and reconstructs itself over time." 14 In this essay I am also concerned with questions of instability and retelling, but with an important distinction: the instabilities presented by the Palmer case, its resistance to historical "closure," do not derive from the absence of an authorized solution. Palmer was hanged and has entered posterity as an infamous poisoner, but this does not mean that his is an inviolably unified story. If closure is considered as a provisional and contingent effect rather than an essential attribute, analysis of a "closed" case can equally (or, in going against the grain of ostensibly settled judgment, better) reveal the vicissitudes of authority and belief at work in constructing historically situated narratives.
Analysis of the case of William Palmer nicely illustrates these points. It poses a host of specific questions about the state of scientific expertise at midcentury and the difficulties involved in taking expert knowledge outside the spatial and conceptual contexts in which it was made. What, for instance, was the place of the medico-legal witness in courts of law and where did his testimony rank along differing contemporary hierarchies of proof? Could expertise sustain itself while at the same time laying bare the unwieldy (and ideally unarticulated) apparatus within which it was generated? These questions inevitably connect with central themes in the histories of medicine and law. Accordingly, the rise of medical professionalization and specialization, the institutionalization of scientific knowledge, the development of the law of evidence, and the role of traditional institutions like the jury in the context of emergent claims of expertise each form a part of the analytical backdrop for what follows. Finally, in considering scientific evidence as an important resource for constructing and contesting a range of meanings stemming from one mid-Victorian poisoning case, historical and historiographical concerns converge: for contemporary observers as for present-day analysts, it is as a lesson in the historically embedded travails of scientific fact-making that the trial of Palmer, "the Rugeley Poisoner," is most compelling.
In 1855 William Palmer was thirty-four years of age and had spent nearly ten years as a licensed general practitioner in the Staffordshire town of Rugeley. Soon after establishing himself in Rugeley, he married Anne, the illegitimate daughter of a former East India official, Colonel Brooke. Brooke had died in 1834, leaving a substantial amount of property to Anne, on condition that it would revert to the Brooke family upon her death. Having no prospect of financial security should he outlive his bride, William Palmer insured Anne's life, taking out three policies totaling ?13,000. Anne died in September of 1854, shortly after returning home from a visit to Liverpool. Her symptoms during her last illness were reported by Palmer himself to William Bamford, her octogenarian medical attendant, as being consistent with cholera, which was at the time rife in Liverpool. On her death, Bamford duly certified and contingent effect rather than an essential attribute, analysis of a "closed" case can equally (or, in going against the grain of ostensibly settled judgment, better) reveal the vicissitudes of authority and belief at work in constructing historically situated narratives.
Analysis of the case of William Palmer nicely illustrates these points. It poses a host of specific questions about the state of scientific expertise at midcentury and the difficulties involved in taking expert knowledge outside the spatial and conceptual contexts in which it was made. What, for instance, was the place of the medico-legal witness in courts of law and where did his testimony rank along differing contemporary hierarchies of proof? Could expertise sustain itself while at the same time laying bare the unwieldy (and ideally unarticulated) apparatus within which it was generated? These questions inevitably connect with central themes in the histories of medicine and law. Accordingly, the rise of medical professionalization and specialization, the institutionalization of scientific knowledge, the development of the law of evidence, and the role of traditional institutions like the jury in the context of emergent claims of expertise each form a part of the analytical backdrop for what follows. Finally, in considering scientific evidence as an important resource for constructing and contesting a range of meanings stemming from one mid-Victorian poisoning case, historical and historiographical concerns converge: for contemporary observers as for present-day analysts, it is as a lesson in the historically embedded travails of scientific fact-making that the trial of Palmer, "the Rugeley Poisoner," is most compelling. The circumstances of Cook's death roused the suspicions of his stepfather and executor, Mr. Stephens, who determined to procure a postmortem examination of the body. Four local doctors, Palmer included, were present at the postmortem on 26 November. According to the subsequent testimony of the other participants, Palmer seemed intent on disrupting the examination, at one point pushing into the lead investigator and causing some of the stomach contents to be spilled, at another moving a jar of viscera to a far comer of the room, after which two slits made with a sharp instrument were discovered on its 15 The circumstances of Cook's death roused the suspicions of his stepfather and executor, Mr. Stephens, who determined to procure a postmortem examination of the body. Four local doctors, Palmer included, were present at the postmortem on 26 November. According to the subsequent testimony of the other participants, Palmer seemed intent on disrupting the examination, at one point pushing into the lead investigator and causing some of the stomach contents to be spilled, at another moving a jar of viscera to a far comer of the room, after which two slits made with a sharp instrument were discovered on its 15 The circumstances of Cook's death roused the suspicions of his stepfather and executor, Mr. Stephens, who determined to procure a postmortem examination of the body. Four local doctors, Palmer included, were present at the postmortem on 26 November. According to the subsequent testimony of the other participants, Palmer seemed intent on disrupting the examination, at one point pushing into the lead investigator and causing some of the stomach contents to be spilled, at another moving a jar of viscera to a far comer of the room, after which two slits made with a sharp instrument were discovered on its 15 The circumstances of Cook's death roused the suspicions of his stepfather and executor, Mr. Stephens, who determined to procure a postmortem examination of the body. Four local doctors, Palmer included, were present at the postmortem on 26 November. According to the subsequent testimony of the other participants, Palmer seemed intent on disrupting the examination, at one point pushing into the lead investigator and causing some of the stomach contents to be spilled, at another moving a jar of viscera to a far comer of the room, after which two slits made with a sharp instrument were discovered on its 15 The circumstances of Cook's death roused the suspicions of his stepfather and executor, Mr. Stephens, who determined to procure a postmortem examination of the body. Four local doctors, Palmer included, were present at the postmortem on 26 November. According to the subsequent testimony of the other participants, Palmer seemed intent on disrupting the examination, at one point pushing into the lead investigator and causing some of the stomach contents to be spilled, at another moving a jar of viscera to a far comer of the room, after which two slits made with a sharp instrument were discovered on its seal.18 The postmortem was completed nevertheless, and the extracted matter forwarded to London for analysis by the eminent Professor Alfred Swaine Taylor.19 The contents arrived (despite, as established in the subsequent trial, Palmer's attempt to bribe the coach driver into staging an accident en route) accompanied by a note from Stephens informing Taylor of his suspicions of foul play.
In
Taylor and his colleague at Guy's Hospital, Dr. Rees, concluded upon analysis that nothing in the appearance of the internal organs would account for death from natural causes. Tests for a wide range of poisons (including strychnine, sought because Stephens had learned that Palmer had recently purchased some, ostensibly as rat poison) yielded only a small amount of antimony, a commonly prescribed mineral compound that acted as an irritant to produce vomiting, but that, if given in repeated doses, could be fatal. In consulting Cook's case history, however, Taylor and Rees could find no record of prescribed antimony.20
In his initial evidence at the Cook inquest (held in the same Talbot Arms where Cook had expired) Taylor focused on the presence of antimony in the body, advising the jury that he and Rees had "no evidence before us to enable us to form a judgment as to the circumstances under which [antimony] was taken by or administered to the deceased, or to enable us to say in this case whether it was or was not the cause of death."21 But the testimony of the next witness dramatically altered Taylor's position. Elizabeth Mills, the chambermaid at the Talbot Arms who had ministered to Cook during his final illness, recounted Cook's reaction to pills given by Palmer on the night prior to and the night of his death. Mills described Cook's convulsive movements (which included beating his bed with his arms and legs, followed by a general stiffening of the limbs), the wild look about his eyes, and his agonized declarations that he was about to die. Taylor intervened at this point to inquire whether any external lacerations were found on the body that might have linked the convulsions to their most obvious explanation-an ordinary case of traumatic tetanus. Hearing that no such marks had been found, Taylor 20 In the trial, the presence of antimony was attributed to several nefarious designs: to weaken Cook so that he could not personally collect the remainder of his winnings; to simulate a slow decline by natural disease; and-more ingeniously still-to enhance the body's capacity to absorb strychnine, thus allowing for the minutest amount to prove fatal. 21 In his initial evidence at the Cook inquest (held in the same Talbot Arms where Cook had expired) Taylor focused on the presence of antimony in the body, advising the jury that he and Rees had "no evidence before us to enable us to form a judgment as to the circumstances under which [antimony] was taken by or administered to the deceased, or to enable us to say in this case whether it was or was not the cause of death."21 But the testimony of the next witness dramatically altered Taylor's position. Elizabeth Mills, the chambermaid at the Talbot Arms who had ministered to Cook during his final illness, recounted Cook's reaction to pills given by Palmer on the night prior to and the night of his death. Mills described Cook's convulsive movements (which included beating his bed with his arms and legs, followed by a general stiffening of the limbs), the wild look about his eyes, and his agonized declarations that he was about to die. Taylor intervened at this point to inquire whether any external lacerations were found on the body that might have linked the convulsions to their most obvious explanation-an ordinary case of traumatic tetanus. Hearing that no such marks had been found, Taylor 20 In the trial, the presence of antimony was attributed to several nefarious designs: to weaken Cook so that he could not personally collect the remainder of his winnings; to simulate a slow decline by natural disease; and-more ingeniously still-to enhance the body's capacity to absorb strychnine, thus allowing for the minutest amount to prove fatal. 21 In his initial evidence at the Cook inquest (held in the same Talbot Arms where Cook had expired) Taylor focused on the presence of antimony in the body, advising the jury that he and Rees had "no evidence before us to enable us to form a judgment as to the circumstances under which [antimony] was taken by or administered to the deceased, or to enable us to say in this case whether it was or was not the cause of death."21 But the testimony of the next witness dramatically altered Taylor's position. Elizabeth Mills, the chambermaid at the Talbot Arms who had ministered to Cook during his final illness, recounted Cook's reaction to pills given by Palmer on the night prior to and the night of his death. Mills described Cook's convulsive movements (which included beating his bed with his arms and legs, followed by a general stiffening of the limbs), the wild look about his eyes, and his agonized declarations that he was about to die. Taylor intervened at this point to inquire whether any external lacerations were found on the body that might have linked the convulsions to their most obvious explanation-an ordinary case of traumatic tetanus. Hearing that no such marks had been found, Taylor 20 In the trial, the presence of antimony was attributed to several nefarious designs: to weaken Cook so that he could not personally collect the remainder of his winnings; to simulate a slow decline by natural disease; and-more ingeniously still-to enhance the body's capacity to absorb strychnine, thus allowing for the minutest amount to prove fatal. 21 In his initial evidence at the Cook inquest (held in the same Talbot Arms where Cook had expired) Taylor focused on the presence of antimony in the body, advising the jury that he and Rees had "no evidence before us to enable us to form a judgment as to the circumstances under which [antimony] was taken by or administered to the deceased, or to enable us to say in this case whether it was or was not the cause of death."21 But the testimony of the next witness dramatically altered Taylor's position. Elizabeth Mills, the chambermaid at the Talbot Arms who had ministered to Cook during his final illness, recounted Cook's reaction to pills given by Palmer on the night prior to and the night of his death. Mills described Cook's convulsive movements (which included beating his bed with his arms and legs, followed by a general stiffening of the limbs), the wild look about his eyes, and his agonized declarations that he was about to die. Taylor intervened at this point to inquire whether any external lacerations were found on the body that might have linked the convulsions to their most obvious explanation-an ordinary case of traumatic tetanus. Hearing that no such marks had been found, Taylor 20 In the trial, the presence of antimony was attributed to several nefarious designs: to weaken Cook so that he could not personally collect the remainder of his winnings; to simulate a slow decline by natural disease; and-more ingeniously still-to enhance the body's capacity to absorb strychnine, thus allowing for the minutest amount to prove fatal. 21 In his initial evidence at the Cook inquest (held in the same Talbot Arms where Cook had expired) Taylor focused on the presence of antimony in the body, advising the jury that he and Rees had "no evidence before us to enable us to form a judgment as to the circumstances under which [antimony] was taken by or administered to the deceased, or to enable us to say in this case whether it was or was not the cause of death."21 But the testimony of the next witness dramatically altered Taylor's position. Elizabeth Mills, the chambermaid at the Talbot Arms who had ministered to Cook during his final illness, recounted Cook's reaction to pills given by Palmer on the night prior to and the night of his death. Mills described Cook's convulsive movements (which included beating his bed with his arms and legs, followed by a general stiffening of the limbs), the wild look about his eyes, and his agonized declarations that he was about to die. Taylor intervened at this point to inquire whether any external lacerations were found on the body that might have linked the convulsions to their most obvious explanation-an ordinary case of traumatic tetanus. Hearing that no such marks had been found, Taylor 20 In the trial, the presence of antimony was attributed to several nefarious designs: to weaken Cook so that he could not personally collect the remainder of his winnings; to simulate a slow decline by natural disease; and-more ingeniously still-to enhance the body's capacity to absorb strychnine, thus allowing for the minutest amount to prove fatal. 21 announced that he was prepared to give a definite opinion as to the cause of death: "My belief is that he died from tetanus, and that tetanus was caused by medicine given to him shortly before his death." The pills, Taylor continued, must have contained strychnine, the only substance to his knowledge capable of producing symptoms like those described. Cook had died in the throes of a tetanic convulsion, and in the absence of any natural cause, Taylor "had not the slightest hesitation" in identifying strychnine as the only credible alternative explanation.22 There was, Taylor conceded, one difficulty with this solution: he had found no strychnine in Cook's body. Yet this admitted of a scientific explanation, Taylor insisted. Unlike metallic poisons that remained in the body and could be made the subject of unambiguous analytical demonstration, an organic substance like strychnine "was so speedily absorbed in the blood that in the course of an hour after the administration no chemical test at present known could detect it." Despite a skeptical summation by the coroner, during which he recalled to the jury's intelligence that no strychnine had been found, and that Taylor had come to his conclusions not on the basis of toxicological analysis but on a chambermaid's description of Cook's dying agonies, the jury returned a verdict "that the deceased died of poison, willfully administered to him by William Palmer."23 Palmer was committed for trial on a coroner's warrant.
II
In the four months between the Rugeley inquest and the trial of William Palmer for Cook's murder, the case remained prominent in the public eye. National interest was intense, and local sentiment was so charged ("divided into Palmerites and Anti-Palmerites," in the words of The Times) that the High Court, in a precedent-setting decision requiring confirmation by act of parliament, moved the trial venue from Staffordshire to the Old Bailey in a bid for an impartial jury.24 Attention to the Palmer case also fed into ongoing and intense discussions on the subject of poison. A spectrum of newspapers that stretched from the progressive Leader to the conservative Saturday Review maintained that England at midcentury was in the clutches of a "poisoning mania."25 The news from announced that he was prepared to give a definite opinion as to the cause of death: "My belief is that he died from tetanus, and that tetanus was caused by medicine given to him shortly before his death." The pills, Taylor continued, must have contained strychnine, the only substance to his knowledge capable of producing symptoms like those described. Cook had died in the throes of a tetanic convulsion, and in the absence of any natural cause, Taylor "had not the slightest hesitation" in identifying strychnine as the only credible alternative explanation.22
There was, Taylor conceded, one difficulty with this solution: he had found no strychnine in Cook's body. Yet this admitted of a scientific explanation, Taylor insisted. Unlike metallic poisons that remained in the body and could be made the subject of unambiguous analytical demonstration, an organic substance like strychnine "was so speedily absorbed in the blood that in the course of an hour after the administration no chemical test at present known could detect it." Despite a skeptical summation by the coroner, during which he recalled to the jury's intelligence that no strychnine had been found, and that Taylor had come to his conclusions not on the basis of toxicological analysis but on a chambermaid's description of Cook's dying agonies, the jury returned a verdict "that the deceased died of poison, willfully administered to him by William Palmer."23 Palmer was committed for trial on a coroner's warrant.
In the four months between the Rugeley inquest and the trial of William Palmer for Cook's murder, the case remained prominent in the public eye. National interest was intense, and local sentiment was so charged ("divided into Palmerites and Anti-Palmerites," in the words of The Times) that the High Court, in a precedent-setting decision requiring confirmation by act of parliament, moved the trial venue from Staffordshire to the Old Bailey in a bid for an impartial jury.24 Attention to the Palmer case also fed into ongoing and intense discussions on the subject of poison. A spectrum of newspapers that stretched from the progressive Leader to the conservative Saturday Review maintained that England at midcentury was in the clutches of a "poisoning mania."25 The news from A self-conscious and profoundly historicized analysis, moreover, structured contemporary understanding of criminal poisoning at the symbolic level. In the first place, none of the reports warning of "panics" and "epidemics" considered criminal poisoning as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon. Having declared it the "Crime of the Age," for example, the Illustrated Times quickly conceded that "poisoning itself, considered simpliciter, is one of the oldest crimes in the world." Yet these accounts were equally insistent on the historical specificity of the problem they were describing. This was because they viewed poisoning as a phenomenon calibrated to a given society's level of "civiliza- occurrences to the interference of local magistrates in the operation of coroners' inquests, a view echoed in Parliament by the Home Secretary himself.31 The Times concurred with the government's assessment, issuing frequent pleas for reform to counter the "alarming increase" in what it described as "a moral epidemic far more formidable than any plague which we are likely to see imported from the East."32 A self-conscious and profoundly historicized analysis, moreover, structured contemporary understanding of criminal poisoning at the symbolic level. In the first place, none of the reports warning of "panics" and "epidemics" considered criminal poisoning as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon. Having declared it the "Crime of the Age," for example, the Illustrated Times quickly conceded that "poisoning itself, considered simpliciter, is one of the oldest crimes in the world." Yet these accounts were equally insistent on the historical specificity of the problem they were describing. This was because they viewed poisoning as a phenomenon calibrated to a given society's level of "civiliza- occurrences to the interference of local magistrates in the operation of coroners' inquests, a view echoed in Parliament by the Home Secretary himself.31 The Times concurred with the government's assessment, issuing frequent pleas for reform to counter the "alarming increase" in what it described as "a moral epidemic far more formidable than any plague which we are likely to see imported from the East."32 A self-conscious and profoundly historicized analysis, moreover, structured contemporary understanding of criminal poisoning at the symbolic level. In the first place, none of the reports warning of "panics" and "epidemics" considered criminal poisoning as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon. Having declared it the "Crime of the Age," for example, the Illustrated Times quickly conceded that "poisoning itself, considered simpliciter, is one of the oldest crimes in the world." Yet these accounts were equally insistent on the historical specificity of the problem they were describing. This was because they viewed poisoning as a phenomenon calibrated to a given society's level of "civiliza- A self-conscious and profoundly historicized analysis, moreover, structured contemporary understanding of criminal poisoning at the symbolic level. In the first place, none of the reports warning of "panics" and "epidemics" considered criminal poisoning as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon. Having declared it the "Crime of the Age," for example, the Illustrated Times quickly conceded that "poisoning itself, considered simpliciter, is one of the oldest crimes in the world." Yet these accounts were equally insistent on the historical specificity of the problem they were describing. This was because they viewed poisoning as a phenomenon calibrated to a given society's level of "civiliza- A self-conscious and profoundly historicized analysis, moreover, structured contemporary understanding of criminal poisoning at the symbolic level. In the first place, none of the reports warning of "panics" and "epidemics" considered criminal poisoning as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon. Having declared it the "Crime of the Age," for example, the Illustrated Times quickly conceded that "poisoning itself, considered simpliciter, is one of the oldest crimes in the world." Yet these accounts were equally insistent on the historical specificity of the problem they were describing. This was because they viewed poisoning as a phenomenon calibrated to a given society's level of "civiliza- Within this historical schema, the mid-Victorian poisoner figured as a kind of apotheosis. Modem England, according to stock analysis, had attained a level of civilization unique unto itself and had produced a correspondingly unique criminal poisoner. The prosperity of this quintessentially liberal bourgeois society derived from a disciplined collection of calculating individuals who acted upon one another in vast, anonymous networks of exchange. Anonymity, mediated action, and disciplined refinement were also the attributes most readily identified with poison as an instrument of crime. Unlike outmoded weapons of physical force, which required a direct confrontation between murderer and victim, poison could do its work at a remove. Mediated violence likewise characterized the nature and actions of poison. As poison was thought to leave no marks directly accessible to the eye, its victims could be construed as characteristically "modem" in presenting to the world an inscrutable facade masking an inner reality. Poison was furthermore classed as the appropriate agent of a prosaic sensibility for which primal motives like passion or revenge had been displaced by market discipline.
As a correlative, according to contemporary accounts, the poisoner's target was transformed through market forces, most notably by the form of associative individualism underwritten by the active trade in life insurance. In the unremarkable lives of the insured, the Illustrated Times lamented, "the floating capital of criminality has found a new investment." Where once "only individuals of some eminence were in some danger," and the poisoner likewise animated by some exalted, if despicable motive, now "the crime is a matter of business and arithmetical calculation," a base commercial transaction. "A generous nature may be betrayed into a great crime by passion," it concluded, "but he who poisons to cheat an insurance office, can have no motive but the pence."34
Commentators also accounted for the historically specific anxieties surrounding criminal poisoning by reference to the scientific character tion." Poisoning was represented as "peculiarly the crime of civilization," predicated on a synergistic relationship of knowledge, prosperity, and corruption. Recalling the example of ancient Rome, in which, as society became more refined, the dagger yielded to poison as the murderous agent of choice, the Illustrated Times proposed a generalizable historical rule for understanding the relationship between forms of violence and their social contexts: "In early days, violence is the characteristic of crime, as of everything else; in later days, craftiness or cunning." 33 Within this historical schema, the mid-Victorian poisoner figured as a kind of apotheosis. Modem England, according to stock analysis, had attained a level of civilization unique unto itself and had produced a correspondingly unique criminal poisoner. The prosperity of this quintessentially liberal bourgeois society derived from a disciplined collection of calculating individuals who acted upon one another in vast, anonymous networks of exchange. Anonymity, mediated action, and disciplined refinement were also the attributes most readily identified with poison as an instrument of crime. Unlike outmoded weapons of physical force, which required a direct confrontation between murderer and victim, poison could do its work at a remove. Mediated violence likewise characterized the nature and actions of poison. As poison was thought to leave no marks directly accessible to the eye, its victims could be construed as characteristically "modem" in presenting to the world an inscrutable facade masking an inner reality. Poison was furthermore classed as the appropriate agent of a prosaic sensibility for which primal motives like passion or revenge had been displaced by market discipline.
Commentators also accounted for the historically specific anxieties surrounding criminal poisoning by reference to the scientific character 33 If it is to be done, it must be done scientifically."35 In its reliance on knowledge over force, moreover, poisoning suggested a kind of perverse meritocracy of learning, featuring a science commodified and popularized through its engagement with the market. Knowledge of the laboratory once (and properly) reserved for the few had become packaged for sale, not merely by means of the moder romance novel (a large proportion of which, the London Medical Gazette complained, "may be regarded as convenient hand-books of poisoning"), but also by the deplorable enterprise of "moder utilitarian philosophers who display their anxiety to establish a free trade in all descriptions of useful and useless knowledge, by doling out natural philosophy by the shilling's-worth, and by imparting a comprehensive insight into the mysteries of the occult sciences in lectures which are very considerately and judiciously limited to the brief period of half an hour."36
Nowhere was the correlation between civilization and subtle, scientific crime more starkly drawn than in a Leader editorial published as the facts of the Cook case were emerging. The peculiar terror generated by the present poisoning wave, it suggested, lay in the realization that "the very regularity of our lives suggests a means for the malefactor to arrive at his purpose, just as the innumerable legal securities for the protection of money transactions furnish opportunities for the forger. of their times. To poison with subtlety and calculation (that is, to poison in the modem idiom) was to poison with science. Indeed, in the opinion of The Times, progress in chemistry and toxicology itself imposed this menacing logic: "We have now reached that advanced stage of civilisation in which it is discovered that drowning a fellow creature, or cutting his throat, or pouring hot lead into his ears, or poisoning him coarsely like a rat, is utterly vain, detection following guilt with fearful accuracy. If it is to be done, it must be done scientifically."35 In its reliance on knowledge over force, moreover, poisoning suggested a kind of perverse meritocracy of learning, featuring a science commodified and popularized through its engagement with the market. Knowledge of the laboratory once (and properly) reserved for the few had become packaged for sale, not merely by means of the moder romance novel (a large proportion of which, the London Medical Gazette complained, "may be regarded as convenient hand-books of poisoning"), but also by the deplorable enterprise of "moder utilitarian philosophers who display their anxiety to establish a free trade in all descriptions of useful and useless knowledge, by doling out natural philosophy by the shilling's-worth, and by imparting a comprehensive insight into the mysteries of the occult sciences in lectures which are very considerately and judiciously limited to the brief period of half an hour."36
Nowhere was the correlation between civilization and subtle, scientific crime more starkly drawn than in a Leader editorial published as the facts of the Cook case were emerging. The peculiar terror generated by the present poisoning wave, it suggested, lay in the realization that "the very regularity of our lives suggests a means for the malefactor to arrive at his purpose, just as the innumerable legal securities for the protection of money transactions furnish opportunities for the forger." 37 But the most troubling point raised in the editorial was suggested by its title, "Poison in the Prescription." The doctor as poisoner combined concerns about the illusory basis of regular domestic relations-the doctor at the bedside, in this instance-with those linking knowledge to crime. "Give a medical man motives for getting rid of his patient," the Leader warned, "and unless he is very clumsy ... he can poison [him] without detection."'38 Here the instabilities characteristic of moder life were laid bare, its categories of order placed on a shifting continuum rather than secured in fixed opposition: progressive knowledge bore the seeds of evil, the In its reliance on knowledge over force, moreover, poisoning suggested a kind of perverse meritocracy of learning, featuring a science commodified and popularized through its engagement with the market. Knowledge of the laboratory once (and properly) reserved for the few had become packaged for sale, not merely by means of the moder romance novel (a large proportion of which, the London Medical Gazette complained, "may be regarded as convenient hand-books of poisoning"), but also by the deplorable enterprise of "moder utilitarian philosophers who display their anxiety to establish a free trade in all descriptions of useful and useless knowledge, by doling out natural philosophy by the shilling's-worth, and by imparting a comprehensive insight into the mysteries of the occult sciences in lectures which are very considerately and judiciously limited to the brief period of half an hour."36
Nowhere was the correlation between civilization and subtle, scientific crime more starkly drawn than in a Leader editorial published as the facts of the Cook case were emerging. The peculiar terror generated by the present poisoning wave, it suggested, lay in the realization that "the very regularity of our lives suggests a means for the malefactor to arrive at his purpose, just as the innumerable legal securities for the protection of money transactions furnish opportunities for the forger." 37 But the most troubling point raised in the editorial was suggested by its title, "Poison in the Prescription." The doctor as poisoner combined concerns about the illusory basis of regular domestic relations-the doctor at the bedside, in this instance-with those linking knowledge to crime. "Give a medical man motives for getting rid of his patient," the Leader warned, "and unless he is very clumsy ... he can poison [him] without detection."'38 Here the instabilities characteristic of moder life were laid bare, its categories of order placed on a shifting continuum rather than secured in fixed opposition: progressive knowledge bore the seeds of evil, the healer was also the destroyer, medicine and poison were not in the last instance distinct and opposing entities.39 Yet if the advance and dissemination of scientific knowledge were part of the problem, they might also represent a solution. Scientists were daily adding to their store of preventative and detective knowledge, and the publicity given to matters of poisoning and to chemistry in general made for a more vigilant citizenry. Thus, despite the dialectical logic of knowledge and refinement, professions of faith that science could in fact win out over the machinations of the secret poisoner were voiced repeatedly. In 1850, the Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, took to the floor of the Commons to assure members "that the detection of murder by poison was so easy that few of them escaped."40 Votes of confidence in modern toxicology were cast right up to eve of the Rugeley affair: the week before the Cook inquest, a Lancet editorial on a recently concluded poisoning case was glowing in its praise for the leading toxicological witnesses, boasting that the evidence given by Taylor and his colleagues had proven "an admirable example of the certainty of the conclusions that modern chemistry and medicine may supply."41 III Clearly, then, the nation had been well primed for the events at Rugeley. Palmer-gambler, insurance profiteer, and medical renegadenonetheless quickly took on proportions all his own, representing as he did the dangerous connections between civilization and poison about which so much was being said. When Alfred Swaine Taylor arrived to give evidence at the Rugeley inquest, he did so representing science's promise to defend civilization against the lethal consequences of its own advances.
The initial reviews of Taylor's performance were favorable, so much so that they at times seemed to betray a desperate rush to declare science capable of exposing the secret poisoner's insidious designs. A tension between faith and anxiety was conspicuous in the Examiner's first commentary on the Palmer affair, entitled "Science in the Witness Box." Subsequently reprinted in The Times, this lengthy editorial consti-39 On more than one occasion, Alfred Swaine Taylor himself reluctantly noted the difficulties in deriving the distinctive properties of poison, writing, e.g., that "we may admit the general truth of the doctrine, that a poison in a small dose is a medicine, and a medicine in a large dose is a poison." Taylor healer was also the destroyer, medicine and poison were not in the last instance distinct and opposing entities.39
Yet if the advance and dissemination of scientific knowledge were part of the problem, they might also represent a solution. Scientists were daily adding to their store of preventative and detective knowledge, and the publicity given to matters of poisoning and to chemistry in general made for a more vigilant citizenry. Thus, despite the dialectical logic of knowledge and refinement, professions of faith that science could in fact win out over the machinations of the secret poisoner were voiced repeatedly. In 1850, the Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, took to the floor of the Commons to assure members "that the detection of murder by poison was so easy that few of them escaped."40 Votes of confidence in modern toxicology were cast right up to eve of the Rugeley affair: the week before the Cook inquest, a Lancet editorial on a recently concluded poisoning case was glowing in its praise for the leading toxicological witnesses, boasting that the evidence given by Taylor and his colleagues had proven "an admirable example of the certainty of the conclusions that modern chemistry and medicine may supply."41 III Clearly, then, the nation had been well primed for the events at Rugeley. Palmer-gambler, insurance profiteer, and medical renegadenonetheless quickly took on proportions all his own, representing as he did the dangerous connections between civilization and poison about which so much was being said. When Alfred Swaine Taylor arrived to give evidence at the Rugeley inquest, he did so representing science's promise to defend civilization against the lethal consequences of its own advances.
The initial reviews of Taylor's performance were favorable, so much so that they at times seemed to betray a desperate rush to declare science capable of exposing the secret poisoner's insidious designs. A tension between faith and anxiety was conspicuous in the Examiner's first commentary on the Palmer affair, entitled "Science in the Witness Box." Subsequently reprinted in The Times, this lengthy editorial consti-39 On more than one occasion, Alfred Swaine Taylor himself reluctantly noted the difficulties in deriving the distinctive properties of poison, writing, e.g., that "we may admit the general truth of the doctrine, that a poison in a small dose is a medicine, and a medicine in a large dose is a poison." Taylor The striking characteristic of the Examiner's opinion piece was not so much its professed faith in the efficacy of science, however, as its insistent recourse to the "speaking body" in articulating its vision of science triumphant. Significantly, its body of choice was not the recalcitrant corpse of Cook, but the more cooperative one of Palmer's wife, Anne. Like Cook's, her body had, on analysis, yielded antimony, but unlike Cook's it had done so in a quantity and a pattern of absorption that would account for death. Using this as its exemplary model, the Examiner declared that bodies could now be relied upon to testify against their assassins, the postmortem examination serving as a call to "let the dead speak." The Examiner then turned to the idiom of speech and the relays of translation that had rendered Anne Palmer's body meaningful: "The dead woman has spoken, and science has presented itself as interpreter .... Not only is the tale of poison told with wonderful precision, but the poison itself is produced in court. The antimony in this bottle, says what remains of the murdered woman, was given to me days before I died; here is the antimony given only a few hours before my death; this again is the poison that ran through my heart."44 42 There were two inquests held at Rugeley connected with Palmer in addition to and immediately following Cook's: those on the exhumed bodies of his wife, Anne, and his brother, Walter. Taylor gave evidence at both of these inquests, finding antimony in Anne's organs and prussic acid in Walter's. In mid-January, Rugeley inquest jurors returned verdicts of murder against Palmer in both Anne and Walter's deaths. But by this time Palmer had already been arraigned for trial for the murder of Cook. It was thus for Cook's death that Palmer was eventually tried, though the charges in the deaths of Anne and Walter remained outstanding if the Cook prosecution failed. Legal niceties were not strictly followed in public comment, however, which tended to refer collectively to the three inquests as "The Rugeley Poisoning Case. tuted a high-profile assessment of the contest between poisoner and scientist in the wake of the Cook inquest and the ensuing inquest on the exhumed body of Palmer's wife.42 It was, in one sense, a pure celebration of a triumphalist toxicology. True, the Rugeley inquests had made it clear that "none of us can be assured against the machinations of the poisoner," but equally evident and more striking still was the fact that science had made the poisoner's life a "hell on earth," an infernal wait for the inevitable day of discovery. The scientific evidence on display at the Rugeley inquests had proven, to the Examiner's great satisfaction, that toxicological expertise had become equal to the challenge of exposing even the most skillful of poisoners: "We do not remember any case exemplifying so remarkably the great advance made in our time by science, not only as our helper in every-day life, but as a power bearing witness against crime."43 The striking characteristic of the Examiner's opinion piece was not so much its professed faith in the efficacy of science, however, as its insistent recourse to the "speaking body" in articulating its vision of science triumphant. Significantly, its body of choice was not the recalcitrant corpse of Cook, but the more cooperative one of Palmer's wife, Anne. Like Cook's, her body had, on analysis, yielded antimony, but unlike Cook's it had done so in a quantity and a pattern of absorption that would account for death. Using this as its exemplary model, the Examiner declared that bodies could now be relied upon to testify against their assassins, the postmortem examination serving as a call to "let the dead speak." The Examiner then turned to the idiom of speech and the relays of translation that had rendered Anne Palmer's body meaningful: "The dead woman has spoken, and science has presented itself as interpreter .... Not only is the tale of poison told with wonderful precision, but the poison itself is produced in court. The antimony in this bottle, says what remains of the murdered woman, was given to me days before I died; here is the antimony given only a few hours before my death; this again is the poison that ran through my heart."44 42 There were two inquests held at Rugeley connected with Palmer in addition to and immediately following Cook's: those on the exhumed bodies of his wife, Anne, and his brother, Walter. Taylor gave evidence at both of these inquests, finding antimony in Anne's organs and prussic acid in Walter's. In mid-January, Rugeley inquest jurors returned verdicts of murder against Palmer in both Anne and Walter's deaths. But by this time Palmer had already been arraigned for trial for the murder of Cook. It was thus for Cook's death that Palmer was eventually tried, though the charges in the deaths of Anne and Walter remained outstanding if the Cook prosecution failed. Legal niceties were not strictly followed in public comment, however, which tended to refer collectively to the three inquests as "The Rugeley Poisoning Case. tuted a high-profile assessment of the contest between poisoner and scientist in the wake of the Cook inquest and the ensuing inquest on the exhumed body of Palmer's wife.42 It was, in one sense, a pure celebration of a triumphalist toxicology. True, the Rugeley inquests had made it clear that "none of us can be assured against the machinations of the poisoner," but equally evident and more striking still was the fact that science had made the poisoner's life a "hell on earth," an infernal wait for the inevitable day of discovery. The scientific evidence on display at the Rugeley inquests had proven, to the Examiner's great satisfaction, that toxicological expertise had become equal to the challenge of exposing even the most skillful of poisoners: "We do not remember any case exemplifying so remarkably the great advance made in our time by science, not only as our helper in every-day life, but as a power bearing witness against crime."43 The striking characteristic of the Examiner's opinion piece was not so much its professed faith in the efficacy of science, however, as its insistent recourse to the "speaking body" in articulating its vision of science triumphant. Significantly, its body of choice was not the recalcitrant corpse of Cook, but the more cooperative one of Palmer's wife, Anne. Like Cook's, her body had, on analysis, yielded antimony, but unlike Cook's it had done so in a quantity and a pattern of absorption that would account for death. Using this as its exemplary model, the Examiner declared that bodies could now be relied upon to testify against their assassins, the postmortem examination serving as a call to "let the dead speak." The Examiner then turned to the idiom of speech and the relays of translation that had rendered Anne Palmer's body meaningful: "The dead woman has spoken, and science has presented itself as interpreter .... Not only is the tale of poison told with wonderful precision, but the poison itself is produced in court. The antimony in this bottle, says what remains of the murdered woman, was given to me days before I died; here is the antimony given only a few hours before my death; this again is the poison that ran through my heart."44 42 There were two inquests held at Rugeley connected with Palmer in addition to and immediately following Cook's: those on the exhumed bodies of his wife, Anne, and his brother, Walter. Taylor gave evidence at both of these inquests, finding antimony in Anne's organs and prussic acid in Walter's. In mid-January, Rugeley inquest jurors returned verdicts of murder against Palmer in both Anne and Walter's deaths. But by this time Palmer had already been arraigned for trial for the murder of Cook. It was thus for Cook's death that Palmer was eventually tried, though the charges in the deaths of Anne and Walter remained outstanding if the Cook prosecution failed. Legal niceties were not strictly followed in public comment, however, which tended to refer collectively to the three inquests as "The Rugeley Poisoning Case. tuted a high-profile assessment of the contest between poisoner and scientist in the wake of the Cook inquest and the ensuing inquest on the exhumed body of Palmer's wife.42 It was, in one sense, a pure celebration of a triumphalist toxicology. True, the Rugeley inquests had made it clear that "none of us can be assured against the machinations of the poisoner," but equally evident and more striking still was the fact that science had made the poisoner's life a "hell on earth," an infernal wait for the inevitable day of discovery. The scientific evidence on display at the Rugeley inquests had proven, to the Examiner's great satisfaction, that toxicological expertise had become equal to the challenge of exposing even the most skillful of poisoners: "We do not remember any case exemplifying so remarkably the great advance made in our time by science, not only as our helper in every-day life, but as a power bearing witness against crime."43 The striking characteristic of the Examiner's opinion piece was not so much its professed faith in the efficacy of science, however, as its insistent recourse to the "speaking body" in articulating its vision of science triumphant. Significantly, its body of choice was not the recalcitrant corpse of Cook, but the more cooperative one of Palmer's wife, Anne. Like Cook's, her body had, on analysis, yielded antimony, but unlike Cook's it had done so in a quantity and a pattern of absorption that would account for death. Using this as its exemplary model, the Examiner declared that bodies could now be relied upon to testify against their assassins, the postmortem examination serving as a call to "let the dead speak." The Examiner then turned to the idiom of speech and the relays of translation that had rendered Anne Palmer's body meaningful: "The dead woman has spoken, and science has presented itself as interpreter .... Not only is the tale of poison told with wonderful precision, but the poison itself is produced in court. The antimony in this bottle, says what remains of the murdered woman, was given to me days before I died; here is the antimony given only a few hours before my death; this again is the poison that ran through my heart."44 42 There were two inquests held at Rugeley connected with Palmer in addition to and immediately following Cook's: those on the exhumed bodies of his wife, Anne, and his brother, Walter. Taylor gave evidence at both of these inquests, finding antimony in Anne's organs and prussic acid in Walter's. In mid-January, Rugeley inquest jurors returned verdicts of murder against Palmer in both Anne and Walter's deaths. But by this time Palmer had already been arraigned for trial for the murder of Cook. It was thus for Cook's death that Palmer was eventually tried, though the charges in the deaths of Anne and Walter remained outstanding if the Cook prosecution failed. Legal niceties were not strictly followed in public comment, however, which tended to refer collectively to the three inquests as "The Rugeley Poisoning Case. tuted a high-profile assessment of the contest between poisoner and scientist in the wake of the Cook inquest and the ensuing inquest on the exhumed body of Palmer's wife.42 It was, in one sense, a pure celebration of a triumphalist toxicology. True, the Rugeley inquests had made it clear that "none of us can be assured against the machinations of the poisoner," but equally evident and more striking still was the fact that science had made the poisoner's life a "hell on earth," an infernal wait for the inevitable day of discovery. The scientific evidence on display at the Rugeley inquests had proven, to the Examiner's great satisfaction, that toxicological expertise had become equal to the challenge of exposing even the most skillful of poisoners: "We do not remember any case exemplifying so remarkably the great advance made in our time by science, not only as our helper in every-day life, but as a power bearing witness against crime."43 The striking characteristic of the Examiner's opinion piece was not so much its professed faith in the efficacy of science, however, as its insistent recourse to the "speaking body" in articulating its vision of science triumphant. Significantly, its body of choice was not the recalcitrant corpse of Cook, but the more cooperative one of Palmer's wife, Anne. Like Cook's, her body had, on analysis, yielded antimony, but unlike Cook's it had done so in a quantity and a pattern of absorption that would account for death. Using this as its exemplary model, the Examiner declared that bodies could now be relied upon to testify against their assassins, the postmortem examination serving as a call to "let the dead speak." The Examiner then turned to the idiom of speech and the relays of translation that had rendered Anne Palmer's body meaningful: "The dead woman has spoken, and science has presented itself as interpreter .... Not only is the tale of poison told with wonderful precision, but the poison itself is produced in court. The antimony in this bottle, says what remains of the murdered woman, was given to me days before I died; here is the antimony given only a few hours before my death; this again is the poison that ran through my heart."44 Yet at the same time, the occultish overtones of the Examiner's celebration, replete with speaking corpses and testifying test tubes, threatened to destabilize the very system of meaning that the editorial sought to uphold. Like the repeated pleadings for Palmer to make a gallows confession, the Examiner was placing in the same analytical frame the ostensibly self-sufficient methods of scientific detection with what seemed like the atavistic desires of a more credulous age. But here the manifest function of the speaking corpse was to confirm the ascendancy of science over another "primitive" discourse of proof: "How vaguely was this foreshadowed in the superstition of our forefathers, whose notion of the best evidence of foul play was to bring a suspected murderer into the presence of the corpse [in the belief that it would bleed]! Precisely the same notion we now carry into effect; but for the supernatural there is put a natural language, which science has acquired the power of interpreting."45 The Examiner thus insisted that bodies, through the offices of scientific expertise, could be made to testify not as a matter of superstition but as a matter of science; the invisible and ephemeral weapon insinuated into the civilized social body could be made tangible through chemical analysis and could itself be brought into court as demonstrative proof of the crime.
As the case of Palmer unfolded, however, the certitudes of scientific translation, the promise of a reconstituted poisonous agent, and the declarative voice of the body from the grave were each put to a severe test. Most obviously, the Examiner's model of chemical materialism appeared to be incompatible with the absence of strychnine in Cook's body, thereby threatening to expose a gap between public expectations and scientific practice. This problem was not new to toxicologists: Taylor himself had broached the issue, with marked ambivalence, in his 1848 edition of On Poisons. As there was not a test for every known poison, and since for those amenable to analysis a variety of circumstances might occur to prevent their detection, Taylor had been anxious not to limit proofs in poisoning cases solely to chemical analysis. "All that is required legally," he insisted, "is that there should be satisfactory proof of a person having died from poison;-the discovery of poison in the body is not necessarily evidence of its having caused death, nor is its non-discovery evidence that death has not been caused by it."46 Yet in the next paragraph Taylor proceeded to trade on the very supposition of materiality that was thought to distinguish chemical from Yet at the same time, the occultish overtones of the Examiner's celebration, replete with speaking corpses and testifying test tubes, threatened to destabilize the very system of meaning that the editorial sought to uphold. Like the repeated pleadings for Palmer to make a gallows confession, the Examiner was placing in the same analytical frame the ostensibly self-sufficient methods of scientific detection with what seemed like the atavistic desires of a more credulous age. But here the manifest function of the speaking corpse was to confirm the ascendancy of science over another "primitive" discourse of proof: "How vaguely was this foreshadowed in the superstition of our forefathers, whose notion of the best evidence of foul play was to bring a suspected murderer into the presence of the corpse [in the belief that it would bleed]! Precisely the same notion we now carry into effect; but for the supernatural there is put a natural language, which science has acquired the power of interpreting."45 The Examiner thus insisted that bodies, through the offices of scientific expertise, could be made to testify not as a matter of superstition but as a matter of science; the invisible and ephemeral weapon insinuated into the civilized social body could be made tangible through chemical analysis and could itself be brought into court as demonstrative proof of the crime.
As the case of Palmer unfolded, however, the certitudes of scientific translation, the promise of a reconstituted poisonous agent, and the declarative voice of the body from the grave were each put to a severe test. Most obviously, the Examiner's model of chemical materialism appeared to be incompatible with the absence of strychnine in Cook's body, thereby threatening to expose a gap between public expectations and scientific practice. This problem was not new to toxicologists: Taylor himself had broached the issue, with marked ambivalence, in his 1848 edition of On Poisons. As there was not a test for every known poison, and since for those amenable to analysis a variety of circumstances might occur to prevent their detection, Taylor had been anxious not to limit proofs in poisoning cases solely to chemical analysis. "All that is required legally," he insisted, "is that there should be satisfactory proof of a person having died from poison;-the discovery of poison in the body is not necessarily evidence of its having caused death, nor is its non-discovery evidence that death has not been caused by it."46 Yet in the next paragraph Taylor proceeded to trade on the very supposition of materiality that was thought to distinguish chemical from against a different form of mystification, equally dangerous in its effect, though opposite in its cause. This threat did not derive from the undue probative value accorded to science, but from the propensity of its representatives to confuse matters to such an extent that a humane jury could do nothing other than acquit. The question to be decided in the Palmer case, the Illustrated Times warned in its issue just prior to the opening of the trial, was ultimately not the value of this or that scientific theory, but the guilt or innocence of Palmer, and the safety of the nation in the face of the poisoning menace. Yet it feared "that this trial may be made so much an opportunity for Dr. A. to fight Dr. B. that, between both, the jury may get puzzled and the prisoner off. Not for an instant do we presume to disparage the sacred importance of the scientific evidence, but we can only hope that it will be remembered that it is not science only, but the application of science to a particular question, which is required."51 Medical journals also acknowledged the possibility of tensions between public and scientific standards of proof in the upcoming trial, and devoted a portion of their pretrial commentary to devising ways to defuse them. The Lancet, most notably, urged Taylor and others concerned with the Crown's evidence to renounce secrecy, even where legally sanctioned. All requests from Palmer's defense regarding the details of the Crown's toxicological findings should be honored, and the process of generating the scientific evidence should involve some form of "external observation to inspire the public mind with confidence in the results."52
In the midst of ruminations about evidentiary vacuums, scientific pedantry, and the closed world of the laboratory, Taylor himself took the unusual step of issuing a number of public statements in the months leading up to the trial, the most controversial of which appeared in the Illustrated Times's fourteen-page special supplement on the Rugeley poisonings. Henry Mayhew, who had been commissioned by the paper to write an investigative series on the connections between life insurance and crime, published-purportedly with Taylor's blessing-the details of his conversation with the "learned analyst" upon whose findings, Mayhew ventured, "will probably depend the fate of the prisoner." Though he subsequently denied having granted permission for the publication of any information relating to the Palmer investigation, Taylor seems to have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by Mayhew to prepare the public to assess equivocal toxicological results. Taylor, Mayhew wrote, "here requested us to state that although the practice of against a different form of mystification, equally dangerous in its effect, though opposite in its cause. This threat did not derive from the undue probative value accorded to science, but from the propensity of its representatives to confuse matters to such an extent that a humane jury could do nothing other than acquit. The question to be decided in the Palmer case, the Illustrated Times warned in its issue just prior to the opening of the trial, was ultimately not the value of this or that scientific theory, but the guilt or innocence of Palmer, and the safety of the nation in the face of the poisoning menace. Yet it feared "that this trial may be made so much an opportunity for Dr. A. to fight Dr. B. that, between both, the jury may get puzzled and the prisoner off. Not for an instant do we presume to disparage the sacred importance of the scientific evidence, but we can only hope that it will be remembered that it is not science only, but the application of science to a particular question, which is required."51 Medical journals also acknowledged the possibility of tensions between public and scientific standards of proof in the upcoming trial, and devoted a portion of their pretrial commentary to devising ways to defuse them. The Lancet, most notably, urged Taylor and others concerned with the Crown's evidence to renounce secrecy, even where legally sanctioned. All requests from Palmer's defense regarding the details of the Crown's toxicological findings should be honored, and the process of generating the scientific evidence should involve some form of "external observation to inspire the public mind with confidence in the results."52
In the midst of ruminations about evidentiary vacuums, scientific pedantry, and the closed world of the laboratory, Taylor himself took the unusual step of issuing a number of public statements in the months leading up to the trial, the most controversial of which appeared in the Illustrated Times's fourteen-page special supplement on the Rugeley poisonings. Henry Mayhew, who had been commissioned by the paper to write an investigative series on the connections between life insurance and crime, published-purportedly with Taylor's blessing-the details of his conversation with the "learned analyst" upon whose findings, Mayhew ventured, "will probably depend the fate of the prisoner." Though he subsequently denied having granted permission for the publication of any information relating to the Palmer investigation, Taylor seems to have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by Mayhew to prepare the public to assess equivocal toxicological results. Taylor, Mayhew wrote, "here requested us to state that although the practice of secret poisoning appeared to be on the increase, it should be remembered that by analysis the chemist could almost always detect the presence of poison in the body, and that when analysis failed, as in cases where small doses of strychnia had been administered, physiology and pathology would invariably suffice to establish the cause of death. Of this there could be no doubt, and the fact could not be made too public."53 In May of 1856, then, the public standing of toxicology was far from straightforward: its leading spokesman was equivocal on the legitimacy of expectations placed on toxicological proof, press opinion was divided between those who warned against sacrificing common sense to chemical pedantry and those descrying the subjective influences at the root of the "detection mania," and the medical press seemed to acknowledge the profession's vulnerability to charges of authoritarianism in taking away the public's capacity for participatory judgment. In this context the case of William Palmer was tried.
IV
Sixty witnesses (more than half of whom were called as representatives of science in one guise or another) testified during Palmer's twelveday trial. Subsequent printed accounts drawn from court reporters' notes typically exceeded 300 pages, of which well over two-thirds were devoted to medical and chemical matters, a proportion roughly conforming to the distribution of coverage in the major press accounts. Toxicology was of course not the only figure in the legal drama: the significance of Palmer's suspicious actions both before and after the death, his financial troubles, his efforts at sabotaging the postmortem investigations, his purchase of strychnine prior to Cook's death, and many other considerations were woven together by the prosecution into a fine chain of circumstantial inference-one that the defense, of course, disputed at crucial links. But as the defense and prosecution both predicted early in the presentation of their respective cases, toxicology, and the toxicology of strychnine in particular, was to play the pivotal role. The defense urged that the law required not only motive and compelling circumstantial evidence secret poisoning appeared to be on the increase, it should be remembered that by analysis the chemist could almost always detect the presence of poison in the body, and that when analysis failed, as in cases where small doses of strychnia had been administered, physiology and pathology would invariably suffice to establish the cause of death. Of this there could be no doubt, and the fact could not be made too public."53 In May of 1856, then, the public standing of toxicology was far from straightforward: its leading spokesman was equivocal on the legitimacy of expectations placed on toxicological proof, press opinion was divided between those who warned against sacrificing common sense to chemical pedantry and those descrying the subjective influences at the root of the "detection mania," and the medical press seemed to acknowledge the profession's vulnerability to charges of authoritarianism in taking away the public's capacity for participatory judgment. In this context the case of William Palmer was tried.
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These circumstances conspired with the lethal properties of strychnine to make its absence in a body no grounds to exclude it as the murderous agent. A substance at once organic and singularly deadly, Cockburn explained, strychnine was "not like a mineral poison, which may be easily detected and reproduced in specie."58 Had the strychnine been given in a large quantity this would not have posed a problem, since rapid death would have resulted from the absorption of a minute trace, and a residue of poison would have remained intact for the analyst to detect. But a physiologically sophisticated poisoner-a licensed medical man, for instance-might introduce the minimum lethal dose, leaving no unabsorbed excess.
Moreover, strychnine affected the nerves controlling the voluntary muscles, inducing convulsive symptoms that, Cockbur declared, were "known to medical men under the term of tetanus."59 This involved the case in still another layer of potential obfuscation. Though he insisted that the tetanic effects of strychnine were distinct from ordinary forms of tetanus, Cockbur admitted that death by strychnine did broadly mimic a recognizable natural pattern. Palmer, "a medical man, understanding the use of strychnia and its effects," had been in a position to take advantage of this symptomatological continuum, as indeed were the experts now called in his defense.60 Accordingly, Cockbum urged the jury to be vigilant against attempts to "confound" the unnatural with the natural, poison with disease.
Reiterated by the prosecution's scientific witnesses, Cockbum's argument received further support from the presiding judge, Lord Chief Justice Campbell. In his final summation, Campbell acknowledged the commonsense bias against the prosecution's charge of strychnine poisoning but advised that "there is no point of law according to which the poison must be found in the body of the deceased; and all that we know respecting the poison not being in the body of Cook is, that in that part of the body that was analysed by Drs. Taylor and Rees they found no strychnia."61 The absence of material proof of strychnine poisoning was thus accounted for as a matter of science and marginalized as a legal inference. In his closing remarks, Cockbur warned that if the proposition that poison must be found in order for poisoning to be proven were to become a matter of legal doctrine, it would be tantamount to giving the chemically sophisticated a license to kill.62 58 Ibid. These circumstances conspired with the lethal properties of strychnine to make its absence in a body no grounds to exclude it as the murderous agent. A substance at once organic and singularly deadly, Cockburn explained, strychnine was "not like a mineral poison, which may be easily detected and reproduced in specie."58 Had the strychnine been given in a large quantity this would not have posed a problem, since rapid death would have resulted from the absorption of a minute trace, and a residue of poison would have remained intact for the analyst to detect. But a physiologically sophisticated poisoner-a licensed medical man, for instance-might introduce the minimum lethal dose, leaving no unabsorbed excess.
Reiterated by the prosecution's scientific witnesses, Cockbum's argument received further support from the presiding judge, Lord Chief Justice Campbell. In his final summation, Campbell acknowledged the commonsense bias against the prosecution's charge of strychnine poisoning but advised that "there is no point of law according to which the poison must be found in the body of the deceased; and all that we know respecting the poison not being in the body of Cook is, that in that part of the body that was analysed by Drs. Taylor and Rees they found no strychnia."61 The absence of material proof of strychnine poisoning was thus accounted for as a matter of science and marginalized as a legal inference. In his closing remarks, Cockbur warned that if the proposition that poison must be found in order for poisoning to be proven were to become a matter of legal doctrine, it would be tantamount to giving the chemically sophisticated a license to kill.62
The defense also believed that the case had grave implications for public safety but cast these in a different light altogether. The greatest threat represented in the trial, argued Palmer's lead attorney, Mr. Serjeant Shee, was not the medical poisoner, but the authoritarian medical detective who, by virtue of his purported expertise, was unaccountable to common standards of material proof. Taylor's claims carried little credence in this particular case, Shee began, because if Cook's convulsive symptoms had been caused by strychnine their suddenness and intensity indicated a pattern of administration favorable to detection. The dose would have been large, the death swift, and the stomach contents undiluted and undisturbed. The fact of Taylor's reputed skill as a chemical analyst was thereby turned to the defense's advantage: if strychnine was present, who better to detect it than the renowned author of On Poisons? At a broader level, Shee continued, Taylor's insistence on his theory of strychnine poisoning despite its absence in Cook's body turned on the dangerous claim that science should be accorded a distinct discourse of proof, one that stood independent of external examination and assessment. "If science is admitted to dogmatise in our courts-science not exact in its nature-science not successful, but baffled even by its own tests-science bearing upon its forehead the motto that 'a little learning is a dangerous thing'-if that is to be introduced into state processes of arriving at truth, conclusive to its satisfaction, but which we cannot follow," Shee warned, not just his client, but society writ large, would be the loser.63
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and institutional reputation. From the very beginning of his association with the case, Shee maintained, Taylor had been the quintessential partisan. Taylor's initial examination had been biased by the stepfather's suspicions that Cook had not died a natural death. His performance at the Talbot Arms confirmed him as an interested party. Having staked his credentials as an expert witness on a highly speculative theory supported by mere "taproom gossip," he had publicly backed himself into a comer: "That opinion was delivered, was irrevocable [sic]. By it Taylor's reputation was staked against Palmer's life."66
Despite the obvious bias of Taylor's evidence, Shee worried aloud, it might well prove effective. This was because, as had been the prosecution's intention, the influence of prestige threatened to obscure the practical deficiencies in its scientific evidence. Deference to institutionalized metropolitan medicine, according to Shee, explained why Taylor's "audacious" charge at the Talbot Arms had swayed the inquest jury.67 The subsequent public discussion of the case in the buildup to the trial had only fanned the flames: recalling the imagery of triumphalist and infallible toxicology that had marked early reports of the Rugeley affair, Shee complained that "for six long months, under the sanction and upon the authority of science, an opinion has universally prevailed that the voice of the blood of John Parsons Cook was crying up unto us from the ground.' 68 But, Shee advised the jury, the prosecution's witnesses, drawn from the elite of British hospital medicine, were precisely the wrong representatives of science to interpret correctly any story that might emanate from Cook's blood. The question to be answered of Cook's death, in the absence of a clear trace of poison, was whether it could be ascribed to a natural cause. The Crown's reliance on prestige was thus misguided, if strategically efficacious. Were a reliable answer sincerely wished, Shee insisted, it was to be sought outside the hospital and the laboratory. He therefore proposed to tap into another vein of expertise, by passing over 66Bennett, The Queen v. Palmer, p. 189. Shee charged that following the inquest Taylor had resorted to the press in a deliberate attempt to manipulate public opinion.
67 All present at the inquest, Shee argued, were "impressed with the idea that whatever the doctor that has come from London, that whatever Dr. Alfred Swaine Taylor says, must be true; if he says it is poison, poison it is" (ibid., p. 202). The same deference then ensured that the jury's finding would meet with general approval: "Instantly followed by the verdict of willful murder, it flew upon the wings of the press into every house in the United Kingdom. It became known that, according to the opinion of a man whose whole life had been devoted to science, a gentleman of personal character perfectly unimpeached, a man who stood well with his friends in the medical profession . . . that, according to his opinion, Cook's death had been caused by strychnine" (ibid., p. 189).
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"mere surgeons of hospitals" whose experience with convulsive symptoms was limited to traumatic cases, in favor of "general practitionersmen who enjoy the entire confidence of numerous families, and have the opportunity of visiting, in the way of their profession, the poor at their lowly dwellings, suffering under sudden convulsions when affected by serious disease: those are the men that we want to tell us about convulsions."69 Taylor himself had publicly declared that where chemistry failed, physiology would prevail. Shee added only that what was required was not a physiology of the extraordinary, but of the everyday. His witnesses duly complied: though disagreeing as to what Cook's dying symptoms signified, the defense experts were as one in declaring that they did not match the profile of strychnine poisoning that each had derived from either his own clinical or experimental practice.70 Of course there was room for toxicological evidence as well. Here too, Shee insisted, the Crown had opted for notoriety over real knowledge in selecting its experts. He acknowledged Taylor as the nation's leading authority on toxicology, the author of the most substantive work on the subject in the English language. Yet in questioning Taylor, Shee sought to expose the limits of this description, pressing him on the extent of his direct experience with the action of strychnine. From the witnessbox Taylor stated that he had never personally seen a human case of strychnine poisoning and that his experimental knowledge was limited both in number (ten studies, five of which had been conducted over twenty years ago) and in kind (involving rabbits only, owing to Taylor's fear of dogs). "Is that the only knowledge of the effects of strychnia poison on animal life which you had when you wrote your book?" Shee inquired. Taylor conceded the point, insisting in reply that the research reported in the scientific literature rendered further testing unnecessary.71
Later in his presentation Shee contrasted the prosecution's experimental recalcitrance with the more enthusiastic and demonstrative approach offered by his experts. He proposed "that some morning before the Court sits ... a reasonable number of animals shall be brought into one of the yards of this building, and that you will see them die by strychnia, and form an opinion yourselves." Though Lord Chief Justice 69Ibid., pp. 197-98. 70 Alternatives to the theory of strychnine poisoning ranged from epileptic convulsions with tetanic complications, angina pectoris, spinal cord irritation of undetermined cause, and tetanic convulsions brought on by wet and cold acting on a body debilitated by syphilis. 71 Taylor retorted: "Every toxicologist will not sacrifice 100 rabbits when the facts are all ascertained from other sources; I did not feel myself justified in going on points which I knew were well established" (Bennett, The Queen v. Palmer, pp. 144-45). "mere surgeons of hospitals" whose experience with convulsive symptoms was limited to traumatic cases, in favor of "general practitionersmen who enjoy the entire confidence of numerous families, and have the opportunity of visiting, in the way of their profession, the poor at their lowly dwellings, suffering under sudden convulsions when affected by serious disease: those are the men that we want to tell us about convulsions."69 Taylor himself had publicly declared that where chemistry failed, physiology would prevail. Shee added only that what was required was not a physiology of the extraordinary, but of the everyday. His witnesses duly complied: though disagreeing as to what Cook's dying symptoms signified, the defense experts were as one in declaring that they did not match the profile of strychnine poisoning that each had derived from either his own clinical or experimental practice.70
Of course there was room for toxicological evidence as well. Here too, Shee insisted, the Crown had opted for notoriety over real knowledge in selecting its experts. He acknowledged Taylor as the nation's leading authority on toxicology, the author of the most substantive work on the subject in the English language. Yet in questioning Taylor, Shee sought to expose the limits of this description, pressing him on the extent of his direct experience with the action of strychnine. From the witnessbox Taylor stated that he had never personally seen a human case of strychnine poisoning and that his experimental knowledge was limited both in number (ten studies, five of which had been conducted over twenty years ago) and in kind (involving rabbits only, owing to Taylor's fear of dogs). "Is that the only knowledge of the effects of strychnia poison on animal life which you had when you wrote your book?" Shee inquired. Taylor conceded the point, insisting in reply that the research reported in the scientific literature rendered further testing unnecessary.71
Later in his presentation Shee contrasted the prosecution's experimental recalcitrance with the more enthusiastic and demonstrative approach offered by his experts. He proposed "that some morning before the Court sits ... a reasonable number of animals shall be brought into one of the yards of this building, and that you will see them die by strychnia, and form an opinion yourselves." Though Lord Chief Justice Campbell ruled out this proposed exercise in unmediated experimental testimony, Shee had made his point.72 When he subsequently advised the jury to conclude from Taylor's testimony that the famed toxicologist "has not any knowledge as to the effects of strychnia more than any of us," Shee was in effect challenging the very claims to disembodied and professionally sanctioned authority upon which medical jurisprudence was supposed to be based.73
Shee's interrogation of the prosecution's star witness, then, not only served to demystify the textual authority of "Taylor" but also highlighted an uncertainty in the protocols for applying scientific expertise to matters of law. Though by midcentury it was a well-settled principle of evidentiary admissibility that, unlike ordinary witnesses, experts could testify on the basis of opinion-and even of opinion not derived from their own firsthand observation74-a good deal of ambiguity still remained about the proper limits of this privilege. In 1851, Robert Christison, the doyen of Scottish toxicology and a pioneer of British legal medicine, produced a seminal article that sought to clarify the situation. There was a pronounced bias in the legal mind favoring testimony based on direct experience, Christison wrote, a bias that betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that the science of medicine actually worked. Medical knowledge, both in its own domain and as applied to legal matters, was largely built out of the observations of others-initially those of the patient him-or herself. Medical "facts," then, were rare in the legal sense of the term. Medicine instead proceeded on "opinion," exercises in synthetic reasoning based on mediated observation, the value of which could not be measured by the standards normally applied to legal testimony. Despite the fact that some judges still disallowed knowledge derived from sources other than direct personal observation (particularly knowledge gleaned from published authorities), recourse to textual authority, in Christison's view, indicated strength in the Campbell ruled out this proposed exercise in unmediated experimental testimony, Shee had made his point.72 When he subsequently advised the jury to conclude from Taylor's testimony that the famed toxicologist "has not any knowledge as to the effects of strychnia more than any of us," Shee was in effect challenging the very claims to disembodied and professionally sanctioned authority upon which medical jurisprudence was supposed to be based.73
Shee's interrogation of the prosecution's star witness, then, not only served to demystify the textual authority of "Taylor" but also highlighted an uncertainty in the protocols for applying scientific expertise to matters of law. Though by midcentury it was a well-settled principle of evidentiary admissibility that, unlike ordinary witnesses, experts could testify on the basis of opinion-and even of opinion not derived from their own firsthand observation74-a good deal of ambiguity still remained about the proper limits of this privilege. In 1851, Robert Christison, the doyen of Scottish toxicology and a pioneer of British legal medicine, produced a seminal article that sought to clarify the situation. There was a pronounced bias in the legal mind favoring testimony based on direct experience, Christison wrote, a bias that betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that the science of medicine actually worked. Medical knowledge, both in its own domain and as applied to legal matters, was largely built out of the observations of others-initially those of the patient him-or herself. Medical "facts," then, were rare in the legal sense of the term. Medicine instead proceeded on "opinion," exercises in synthetic reasoning based on mediated observation, the value of which could not be measured by the standards normally applied to legal testimony. Despite the fact that some judges still disallowed knowledge derived from sources other than direct personal observation (particularly knowledge gleaned from published authorities), recourse to textual authority, in Christison's view, indicated strength in the Yet "On Strychnia" was not merely an effort to reinforce the verdict in The Queen v. Palmer. In publishing it, Taylor also began a campaign to add Cook's name to the roster of documented cases of strychnine poisoning, to constitute Cook as a secure marker of toxicological knowledge. The centerpiece of his exposition was an eight-page "table of cases" providing details of all the recorded cases to which, in his estimation, strychnine had been properly connected. The table was The next significant engagement came some three years later, when, in 1859, Taylor published his second, and substantially revised, edition of On Poisons. Palmer's presence is palpable in the 1859 version, Taylor himself noting in several places the unusual degree to which the case is invoked in, and indeed shapes, the text.90 In 1848, strychnine was an unremarkable three-page entry; in 1859, twenty-four pages were devoted to it, including six providing details of the Palmer case itself. Taylor's discussion of the symptomatology and pathology of strychnine poisoning grew from two paragraphs to six pages, and it was here that Taylor first incorporated many of the terms used in the Palmer case-listing the "macabre grin" (or "risus sardonicus") on Cook's visage, the violent 89 Ibid., p. 341. 90 At times the reference to The Queen v. Palmer is a general one, referred to in one instance as "that memorable case which has furnished some point of illustration to almost every department of medical jurisprudence" (Taylor, On Poisons [1859], p. 195). Elsewhere the case is invoked to underscore a broad principle, as when he urges the fallacy of relying on positive tests as proof of poisoning: "In nearly every chapter on every poison in this volume, the reader will find that chemistry has in some cases completely failed to reveal the presence of poison, while in others it has misled an 'expert' to swear to the presence of poison in a definitive quantity in a dead body when the whole was a fiction of the imagination" (ibid., p. 702). three pages of condensed type, the longest passage of reported speech in the entire article) what in his view would have been a legitimate defense rebuttal had he and Rees claimed a positive identification of strychnine in Cook's body. "What!" Taylor's imagined inquisitor exclaimed after a dense and compelling exposure of the fallacies of "enthusiastic" chemistry: "a man's life is to depend on the alleged detection of the 1000th of a grain of strychnia, and that, as I understand it, not actually separated in a tangible form, but merely judged to be present by two learned gentlemen who were diligently looking for it, expecting it, nay, wishing it, in order to bolster up their theory of the cause of death?"89
Objections of this kind, Taylor concluded, would have been "very properly taken." The cogency of Taylor's hypothetical objection was of course intentional, serving to underscore both the plasticity of legal argument and the dangers inherent in toxicological "enthusiasm." Professions of toxicological ambiguity, after all, were a necessary part of Taylor's own position, but the fact that they appear as a matter of design does not preclude their capacity to subvert the foundations of Taylor The next significant engagement came some three years later, when, in 1859, Taylor published his second, and substantially revised, edition of On Poisons. Palmer's presence is palpable in the 1859 version, Taylor himself noting in several places the unusual degree to which the case is invoked in, and indeed shapes, the text.90 In 1848, strychnine was an unremarkable three-page entry; in 1859, twenty-four pages were devoted to it, including six providing details of the Palmer case itself. Taylor's discussion of the symptomatology and pathology of strychnine poisoning grew from two paragraphs to six pages, and it was here that Taylor first incorporated many of the terms used in the Palmer case-listing the "macabre grin" (or "risus sardonicus") on Cook's visage, the violent 89 Ibid., p. 341. 90 At times the reference to The Queen v. Palmer is a general one, referred to in one instance as "that memorable case which has furnished some point of illustration to almost every department of medical jurisprudence" (Taylor, On Poisons [1859], p. 195). Elsewhere the case is invoked to underscore a broad principle, as when he urges the fallacy of relying on positive tests as proof of poisoning: "In nearly every chapter on every poison in this volume, the reader will find that chemistry has in some cases completely failed to reveal the presence of poison, while in others it has misled an 'expert' to swear to the presence of poison in a definitive quantity in a dead body when the whole was a fiction of the imagination" (ibid., p. 702). three pages of condensed type, the longest passage of reported speech in the entire article) what in his view would have been a legitimate defense rebuttal had he and Rees claimed a positive identification of strychnine in Cook's body. "What!" Taylor's imagined inquisitor exclaimed after a dense and compelling exposure of the fallacies of "enthusiastic" chemistry: "a man's life is to depend on the alleged detection of the 1000th of a grain of strychnia, and that, as I understand it, not actually separated in a tangible form, but merely judged to be present by two learned gentlemen who were diligently looking for it, expecting it, nay, wishing it, in order to bolster up their theory of the cause of death?"89
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"twitching" and "jerking" of his body, and his sense of impending death (his repeated cry of "I shall die") as integral signs of strychnine poisoning.91
Shifting the comparative focus from the first to the third edition, moreover, reveals the reverse tendency-toward a disassociation between knowledge of strychnine and knowledge of the Palmer case. Methods for detecting strychnine, for example (entirely absent from Taylor's 1848 work), were laid out in 1859 with direct reference to the questions raised in the Palmer trial. By 1875, however, Palmer had been dispensed with as a framing apparatus. A similar process of disassociation can be discerned in Taylor 
